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Introduction 
The most famous anecdote on business ethics is ascribed to Karl Kraus. To a student asking 
him for his opinion, he answered: ‘You want to study business ethics? You have to make a 
choice: business or ethics!’. The relationship between the pursuit of profit and the respect of 
ethical values is at the centre of the international activities of firms. Whenever they are active 
abroad, there are two types of risk, which are under-regulation and over-regulation. On the 
one hand, companies may come into a legal vacuum, if neither the home nor the host country 
is willing or able to apply its rules, or if rules applicable to the activity in question do not exist 
at all. Firms may exploit this vacuum by taking advantage of low labour, health, 
environmental, tax, or consumer protection standards. On the other hand, it may occur that 
two or more countries apply their rules simultaneously. In this case, the company may be 
subject to an excessive burden. In the worst case, the authorities of different countries may 
impose administrative decisions which are contradictory. 
These problems cannot be solved by domestic legislation alone. Of course, it is possible for a 
State to extend the geographic scope of its regulations in order to cure under-regulation 
(provided that the jurisdictional limits resulting from public international law are respected). 
However, often it will not be easy to obtain information about facts which have taken place 
abroad. Furthermore, the extraterritorial application of domestic law will increase the risk of 
conflicts with other jurisdictions. Moreover, the interest of political institutions in regulating 
behaviour of domestic firms abroad may be limited. Hence, there is an urgent need of 
international coordination in order to overcome the problems raised by trans-border business. 
The general verdict applies that trans-border problems can only be solved internationally. 
The following remarks will focus on the attention which transnational corporations have 
attracted in public international law over recent decades. The starting point is the world of the 
Codes of Conduct in the 1970s and 1980s, followed by the experience with the United 
Nations (UN) Global Compact in the broader context of Corporate Social Responsibility, and 
the work of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General on Business and Human 
Rights, before a proposal for an International Code on Corporate Responsibility is submitted. 
The article is written not only in honour of a pre-eminent scholar who has tremendous merits 
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in the development of international law, but also for a teacher and mentor to me. One of the 
inspirations originating from the legendary atmosphere at his Munich chair led to an article on 
the non-binding rules for international economic activities.
1
 Twelve years later, the time has 
come to analyze the important developments that have taken place since then. We will see 
that the status of business enterprises has changed so that some defend the idea that they have 
developed from mere objects to subjects of public international law. Be that as it may, the 
topic is a perfect example for a phenomenon that Bruno Simma - in a different context - has 
called ‘the great shades of nuance that permeate international law’.2 
 
II. UN Codes of Conduct 
The awareness of governance gaps in the international economy is not new.
3
 In the 1960s and 
1970s a comprehensive framework was aimed at in order to fill these gaps. It was the time of 
the New International Economic Order. The Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States 
(1974) established rules on the economic relations between States based on the principle of 
national sovereignty. As rights and duties of States were at the centre of the Charter, the 
behaviour of firms was only touched upon at the edge. Further obligations of corporations 
were elaborated in a couple of UN Codes of Conduct.
4
 Some of them were formally adopted 
by the competent bodies and thus gained the status of soft law. Others have stayed drafts 
discussed during decades. Examples of texts which have been adopted are the Tripartite 
Declaration of Principles Concerning Multinational Enterprises and Social Policy 
(International Labour Organization (ILO), 1977), the Set of Multilaterally Agreed Equitable 
Principles and Rules for the Control of Restrictive Business Practices (UN General Assembly, 
1980), the Infant Formula Code (World Health Organization, 1981) and the Pesticides Code 
(Food and Agriculture Organization, 1985).
5
 The most well-known failures are the Code on 
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the Transfer of Technology and the Code of Conduct on Transnational Corporations. The 
breaking off of negotiations for the latter text in 1992 marks the end of the era of UN Codes 
of Conduct. 
Nowadays, some aspects of the New International Economic Order programme seem out-
dated, such as the assumption of an insurmountable conflict of interest between developing 
countries and transnational corporations, or the claims for a redistribution of wealth from the 
North to the South. Instead, there is a growing recognition that economic exchange is 
beneficial for all sides if the regulatory framework is adequately designed. The term ‘Code of 
Conduct’ has changed its meaning. Since the 1990s, it is preponderantly used for private 
codes of conduct instead for the international texts adopted within the UN family. Private 
codes of conduct are adopted by single firms (and nearly every big firm has such a text today) 
or sector-wide, such as the 4C Code of Conduct (coffee sector) or the Voluntary Principles on 
Security and Human Rights (extractive sector). 
The most active forum of the ‘old’ world of public Codes of Conduct is constituted by the 
Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) Guidelines for 
Multinational Enterprises (1976, last version 2000, currently under revision). In the 
guidelines, governments recommend that multinational enterprises should respect certain 
principles and standards in the fields of general policy, disclosure, employment, environment, 
anti-corruption, competition, taxation, etc. Of particular importance is the implementation 
procedure: participating States must install National Contact Points (NCPs) which are 
competent to handle grievances. Thus, a type of individual complaint is introduced which is 
unusual in the world of codes of conduct. However, NCPs are criticized for their proximity to 
governments, their lack of resources, and the absence of precise rules.
6
 Moreover, for the 
NCPs to be competent, the individual case must have an investment nexus, and the 
corporation in question must originate from an OECD member State or another State adhering 
to the Guidelines or must have operated in one of these States. Not least because of the non-
universal character of the OECD Guidelines, a global forum had to be set up. 
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III. The UN Global Compact and Corporate Social Responsibility 
1. Historical context 
International economic integration (often described as globalization) has intensified rapidly, 
especially after the revolutions of 1989. The foundation of the World Trade Organization in 
1995 responded to the new situation. At the same time, global awareness of negative effects 
rose. Private firms increasingly had to justify themselves for business behaviour abroad. In the 
United States (US), civil actions under the Alien Torts Claim Act were brought against 
transnational corporations.
7
 In 1996, Burmese farmers sued a US oil company for the 
violation of human rights in the context of relocation of villages and forced labour due to a 
pipeline project in Myanmar.
8
 In the same year, the family of Ken Saro-Wiwa brought an 
action to a US court against Royal Dutch Shell for complicity in violations of human rights, 
including the judicial hangings of the Ogoni Nine, in the context of oil exploration in the 
Niger Delta.
9
 Both cases were settled, as often occurs in this field.
10
 Hence, no conclusive 
findings of the alleged human rights violations have been established. However, the cases 
make clear that under US law corporations may be held liable for complicity with human 
rights violations. 
In the same period, public protests against different aspects of the growing 
internationalization became more visible and condensed into the anti-, respectively alter-
globalization movement. In this context, the then UN Secretary-General, Kofi Annan, 
underlined the leading role of private firms in the process of globalization and proposed the 
creation of a platform whose task would be to assist businesses in developing socially 
responsible and sustainable policies. As a result, the Global Compact was launched in 2000.
11
 
 
                                                 
7
 See the overview on relevant Alien Torts Claim Act cases by M Koebele, Corporate Responsibility under the 
Alien Tort Statute (Martinus Nijhoff, 2009); M Schaub, Grundlagen der Regulierung internationaler 
Unternehmen (Doctoral thesis, University of Zurich, 2010) 5 II 4. 
8
 Roe/Doe v Unocal (2002) 395 F 3d 932 (US Court of Appeals 9th Cir). 
9
 See, eg, Wiwa v Royal Dutch Petroleum Co (2000) 226 F 3d 88 (US Court of Appeals 2nd Cir) rejecting 
dismissal based on the forum non conveniens doctrine. A recent example for a claim under the Alien Torts Claim 
Act is the admission by the US Supreme Court of a lawsuit of Nigerian families against the drug company Pfizer 
for alleged non-authorized use of new antibiotics on their children, see Pfizer Inc v Abdullahi (2010) 130 S Ct 
3541 (US Sup Ct). 
10
 The majority of (alleged) abuses are situated in the extractive industries (oil, gas and mining), followed by the 
food and beverages industry, apparel and footwear, and the information and communication technology sector, 
see J Ruggie, ‘Interim Report of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General on the issue of human 
rights and transnational corporations and other business enterprises’ UN Doc E/CN.4/2006/97 (22 February 
2006) no 25. 
11
 See in detail S von Schorlemer (ed), Praxishandbuch UNO (Berlin: Springer, 2003) 507. 
5 
2. The ten principles and their implementation 
The Global Compact is not a Code of Conduct, but a forum which is supposed to gain private 
companies’ support for the UN goals. It is based on ten principles in the areas of human 
rights, labour, environment, and anti-corruption. Businesses shall support, within their sphere 
of influence, the protection of human rights and make sure that they do not participate in 
violations. The labour standards include the freedom of association and of collective 
bargaining as well as the prohibition of compulsory labour, child labour, and discrimination. 
In the environmental field, firms have to apply the precautionary principle and have to be 
proactive by, for example, supporting environmentally friendly technologies. Finally, they 
have to work against corruption in all its forms. 
The principles are not binding. Instead, participants have to submit annually a 
Communication on Progress (COP) in which they give an overview of the practical actions 
taken and the outcome of these actions including measurement. These communications are 
published on the Global Compact’s website. Participants which do not deliver are listed as 
non-communicating participants. The quality of COPs is quite diverse: everything can be 
found from a very general two-page text to detailed reports on specific actions taken and their 
results. Increasingly, COPs are integrated into the companies’ general reporting on Corporate 
Social Responsibility.
12
 
One of the sensitive points of corporate responsibility is the extension of accepted principles 
to the supply chain. The adoption of high standards would not be credible if intermediate 
products or services are bought from entities which do not respect these standards on their 
part. The subject has gained in importance with the process of outsourcing, subcontracting, 
and offshoring to countries with lower productions costs, lower wages, and lower labour and 
environmental standards. According to the ‘sweatshop argument’, low wages and bad 
working conditions are exploited by transnational corporations which disintegrate vertically 
and dislocate manufacturing as soon as rules are tightened in a certain country. This argument 
could be countered by a system in which companies voluntarily adhere to minimum 
standards, for example in the fields of labour law, environment, and human rights. Today, the 
opinion is wide-spread that procurement is not value-neutral and that social responsibility 
applies also to the supply chain. However, it is much more difficult and burdensome to 
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implement legal and ethical standards with respect to firms other than one’s own.13 Therefore, 
one of the central topics of the Global Compact is how to improve the respect of the ten 
principles in supply chains.
14
 
Another area of interest is investment: The Global Compact has extended the ten principles to 
investment practices by drawing the attention of investors to the environmental, social, and 
governance (ESG) consequences of their decisions. A concrete result are the ‘Principles for 
Responsible Investment’ (PRI) developed by an international group of investors, adopted 
under the auspices of UN Global Compact and United Nations Environment Programme 
Finance Initiative (UNEP FI), and launched in 2006.
15
 The six principles focus on the 
importance of ESG issues for investment decisions and provide for a reporting obligation. 
Each of the principles contains a list of possible actions. The principles aim at reversing an 
old question: whereas in the past the question was asked if fiduciaries are allowed to practise 
responsible investment, PRI wants to establish a general commitment to do so. However, it 
would be naive to say that the financial industry as a whole has already endorsed this concept. 
Until now, and in spite of its growing importance, the PRI still concern a niche market.
16
 
 
3. Corporate Social Responsibility 
The Global Compact, with more than 8,000 signatories worldwide (businesses and civil 
society), is the most prominent initiative in the field of business responsibility worldwide. 
However, it is only the especially visible part of a general phenomenon which is called 
Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR).
17
 Many firms today communicate about their 
behaviour as ‘corporate citizens’ and publish sustainability or social responsibility reports. 
Often they do so in the context of the Global Reporting Initiative (GRI) which was founded 
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by private actors in collaboration with UNEP. GRI has published reporting guidelines which 
are used by a growing number of businesses and non-businesses and which are refined 
continuously. The goal of GRI is to establish social reporting as a complement to financial 
reporting.
18
 There is a close link to the Global Compact: its rules encourage integrating COPs 
into existing texts like corporate responsibility or sustainability reports.
19
 Thus, it is possible 
to avoid duplication of work and to bundle CSR-activities.
20
 The most common names are 
‘CSR Report’ or ‘Sustainability Report’, but there are also individual terms like ‘Citizenship 
Report’ or ‘Report to Society’. GRI gives ratings on the quality of reports. 
The idea underlying CSR is that of a company which not only pursues economic goals, but 
that takes into account the impact of its activities on all spheres of public life.
21
 Closely linked 
to the concept of CSR is the distinction between shareholder value and stakeholder value. 
Another trait is the so-called ‘triple bottom line’ which complements a purely economic way 
of measuring success by an ecological and social component.
22
 Many companies today have 
texts in which they incur commitments in this area. The headings differ, but generally codes 
of ethics refer to non-economic values, codes of conduct give orientation to employees, and 
codes of practice specify rules for a certain profession. These texts go beyond compliance 
policies which are restricted to the respect of existing rules whereas CSR codes include 
voluntary commitments and aim at filling regulatory vacuums. The International Organization 
for Standardization (ISO) is currently developing ISO 26000 as the standard for CSR 
activities.
i
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The topic has become so important that the European Commission has submitted a report 
setting the objective for Europe to become a pole of excellence in the field of CSR.
23
 A 
‘European Alliance for CSR’ was founded in which, on the one hand, the European 
Commission undertakes to strengthen a business friendly environment, and where, on the 
other hand, European companies (large and small) incur the commitment to innovate CSR 
initiatives further. They do so for example within the European business network ‘CSR 
Europe’ which aims at developing CSR best practices for its members. In the 2008 
Competitiveness Report, the European Commission analyzed the impact of CSR on different 
determinants of competitiveness at firm level. The result is that this influence may be positive 
but that it varies according to sectors and sizes of companies. The contribution of CSR is 
strongest regarding human resources, risk and reputation management, and innovation. It is 
less strong (but still existent according to circumstances) in the field of cost structure, the 
customer perspective, and financial markets. Regarding costs, for example, CSR may benefit 
a company by attracting motivated employees or by avoiding risks. On the other hand, the 
additional costs of CSR may outweigh these benefits. The result of this calculation varies 
according to the different economic sectors.
24
 In sectors which are particularly cost-sensitive, 
there will be a strong incentive to respect only legally binding rules. 
In the European Union (EU), Denmark has gone one step further by adopting legislation on 
CSR Reporting. Since 2009, large companies have to give information on CSR in the annual 
financial reports. The mechanism is voluntary: only companies that have CSR policies are 
subject to the reporting requirements. They may refer to existing sustainability reports. 
Companies that do not have such a policy and do not want to introduce it, have to state in 
their report that they do not have a CSR policy.
25
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IV. The Special Representative of the Secretary-General on Business and Human Rights 
1. Mandate 
Closely linked to the discussion on the Global Compact and on CSR is the work of the 
Special Representative of the Secretary-General on Business and Human Rights.
26
 The story 
of this most recent development started with a failure. In 2003, the Sub-Commission of the 
former UN Commission on Human Rights adopted norms on the responsibilities of 
transnational corporations with regard to human rights, for example in the fields of non-
discrimination, security of persons, rights of workers, anti-corruption, consumer protection, 
and environment.
27
 For this purpose, mechanisms for the implementation of these 
commitments were established, for example reporting duties and external monitoring. 
However, the Commission on Human Rights and, subsequently, the UN Economic and Social 
Council (ECOSOC) did not embrace the proposal of the Sub-Commission.
28
 Thereupon, the 
UN High Commissioner on Human Rights delivered a report including a description of 
existing initiatives and standards on business and human rights.
29
 She concluded that 
numerous issues required further study. In response to the High Commissioner’s 
recommendations, the Commission on Human Rights requested the UN Secretary-General to 
appoint a special representative on the issue of human rights and transnational corporations.
30
 
This request was accommodated by the appointment of John Ruggie as the Special 
Representative of the Secretary-General on Human Rights and Transnational Corporations 
and Other Business Enterprises in 2005. In 2008, his mandate was extended until 2011. 
                                                 
26
 For a comparison of the different approaches see S MacLeod, ‘Reconciling Regulatory Approaches to 
Corporate Social Responsibility: The European Union, OECD and United Nations Compared’ (2007) 13 Eur 
Public L 671. 
27
 Sub-Commission on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights, ‘Norms on the responsibilities of 
transnational corporations and other business enterprises with regard to human rights’ UN Doc 
E/CN.4/Sub.2/2003/12/Rev.2 (26 August 2003); ‘Commentary on the Norms on the responsibilities of 
transnational corporations and other business enterprises with regard to human rights’ UN Doc 
E/CN.4/Sub.2/2003/38/Rev.2 (26 August 2003). On these texts see Kinley and Chambers, ‘The UN Human 
Rights Norms for Corporations’ (n 4); K Nowrot, Die UN-Norms on the Responsibility of Transnational 
Corporations and Other Business Enterprises with Regard to Human Rights (University Halle-Wittenberg, 
2003); D Weissbrodt and M Kruger, ‘Human Rights Responsibilities of Businesses as Non-State Actors’ in P 
Alston (ed), Non-State Actors and Human Rights (Oxford University Press, 2005). 
28
 ECOSOC_Res 2004/279, ‘Responsibilities of transnational corporations and related business enterprises with 
regard to human rights’ (22 July 2004). For the reasons see J Ruggie, ‘Business and human rights: Towards 
operationalizing the “protect, respect and remedy” framework’ UN Doc A/HRC/11/13 (22 April 2009), no 58: 
the draft norms ‘so co-mingled the respective responsibilities of States and companies that it was difficult if not 
impossible to disentangle the two’. One could add another reason: the UN norms were the first non-voluntary 
initiative in CSR and hence met with strong resistance. 
29
 UNHCHR ‘Report on the responsibilities of transnational corporations and related business enterprises with 
regard to human rights’ UN Doc E/CN.4/2005/91 (15 February 2005). 
30
 UNCHR ’Res 69’ (2005) UN Doc E/CN.4/RES/2005/69. 
10 
The terms of reference of the Special Representative do not overlap completely with the 
subject of CSR. On the one hand, his field of work is human rights, not the protection of the 
environment or the other areas mentioned above, at least not as such.
31
 On the other hand, his 
mandate goes further as he has to put human rights into a general perspective not restricted to 
firm behaviour. During his first mandate (2005–08), the Special Representative developed a 
general policy framework on the subject of business and human rights. His second mandate 
(2008–11) aims at operationalizing this approach in order to provide specific guidance to 
public and private actors. 
 
2. The protect, respect, and remedy framework 
The general framework is based on three core principles, ‘the State duty to protect against 
human rights abuses by third parties, including business; the corporate responsibility to 
respect human rights; and the need for more effective access to remedies’.32 This concept has 
been accepted equally by business associations and human rights organizations because it 
strikes a balance between responsibilities of States and private actors. At the same time, it 
underlines the necessity for victims to have effective remedies, judicial and non-judicial. It is 
the clear goal of this ‘principled pragmatism’ to achieve concrete progress in the daily lives of 
people and to leave behind the ideological clashes of the 1970s and 1980s. 
As regards the first principle, States in the first place have to refrain from violating human 
rights. But they have positive obligations, too. Article 2(1) of the International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights, for example, not only obliges a State to respect fundamental rights, 
but also ‘to ensure to all individuals within its territory and subject to its jurisdiction the rights 
recognized in the present Covenant’. This includes the obligation for States to take active 
measures in order to protect right holders against interference from private actors including 
businesses.
33
 Only if the State undertakes all reasonable measures to be expected according to 
circumstances, will corporate interference not be imputed to the State in question (standard of 
conduct versus standard of result). For example, a State has to prohibit corporate abuse by 
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law, to investigate alleged violations, to bring perpetrators to justice, and to grant effective 
remedies to victims.
34
 It is clear that these principles apply to acts within the territory of the 
State in question. It is one of the most difficult and most debated questions if and to what 
extent States are responsible for preventing abuses abroad.
35
 The Special Representative is 
rather cautious in this respect,
36
 but he points to the options States have in this respect, for 
example human rights conditionalities in public procurement, export credit guarantees, and 
public insurance of foreign investments.
37
 
The second principle is a novelty and concerns the relevance of human rights for businesses 
themselves. Contrary to the duty of States to protect human rights, the policy framework of 
the Special Representative uses with regard to corporations the term ‘responsibility to 
respect’.38 The underlying idea is that, according to traditional opinion, international human 
rights do not impose obligations directly on companies. Such obligations occur only if 
domestic law evolves in this sense. However, the international practice expressed by the 
Global Compact as well as soft law instruments like the ILO Tripartite Declaration and the 
OECD Guidelines underline the responsibility of companies with regard to human rights. 
Civil society carefully observes compliance with this responsibility.
39
 The Special 
Representative has summarized this development by saying that in addition to the legal 
licence to operate, the success of a company depends also on a ‘social licence to operate’.40 
Firms must not only avoid the infringement of rights (‘do no harm’), but they have also to 
address abuse committed by others. For this purpose, the Special Representative has proposed 
that companies introduce a human rights due diligence consisting of a human rights policy, an 
impact assessment, the creation of an integrated human rights corporate culture, and 
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systematic reporting on these subjects.
41
 The Special Representative underlines the fact that 
company behaviour may have an impact on all existing human rights, not only on those 
related to the economy.
42
 The basic texts are the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the International Covenant on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights,
43
 and the ILO core conventions. As these texts are in essence 
State-related, they have to be ‘translated’ into behavioural standards for businesses.44 
Corporations do not carry the same responsibilities States have.
45
 The work of the Special 
Representative is characterized by the attempt not to exaggerate the expectations towards 
businesses in this field. 
According to the third principle of the general framework, victims of human rights violations 
must have access to effective remedies. At the company level, grievance mechanisms have to 
be constituted. At State level, judicial remedies must be created which may be complemented 
by non-judicial mechanisms, for example national human rights institutions or the NCPs 
provided for by the OECD Guidelines. Other forms of redress are imaginable.
46
 
 
3. Outlook 
Whereas the Global Compact has brought together private companies and the UN, the 
aspirations of the Special Representative are broader in that he strives for a comprehensive 
framework defining the respective tasks of States and private actors in the field of human 
rights. The more general approach makes it possible for all determinants to be taken into 
consideration which hitherto were separated from one another. For example, bilateral 
investment treaties have turned out to have a great impact on human rights matters. As they 
often have not been coordinated with human rights concerns, tensions arise, for example 
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regarding stabilization clauses which exempt investors from subsequent public policy 
measures.
47
 The Special Representative attracts attention to the necessity of integrating human 
rights aspects as a horizontal aspect in all kinds of international agreements. 
Up until now, the Special Representative has submitted highly informative reports on the 
relationship between business and human rights. However, without the conclusion of a special 
treaty on corporate responsibility, the legal basis for human rights obligations of private actors 
stays vague. Therefore, in the absence of new conventional obligations, the work of the 
Special Representative would only have a legal effect if his guidance had an impact on State 
practice meeting the high requirements for a change in customary law. It is more realistic to 
say that the legal consequences of his work will be restricted to modifying the lex 
mercatoria.</p> 
 
V. Legal Personality of Transnational Corporations in Public International Law? 
As we have seen, initiatives like the Global Compact or the policy framework of the Special 
Representative aspire to bridge governance gaps and to integrate businesses into the values of 
public international law. From a legal point of view, it is important to determine the status of 
the commitments formed by this development. Even if public international law has started to 
introduce rights which may be directly invoked by private parties,
48
 obligations normally do 
not become effective until domestic law has taken them over.
49
 An obligation of undertakings 
to respect human rights would amount to a direct horizontal effect of these rights, a concept 
which is far from generally being accepted even in domestic law. Therefore, according to the 
traditional view, international law does not directly address transnational corporations. 
                                                 
47
 Problems could be solved by integrating human rights aspects into bilateral investment treaties, see 
International Institute for Sustainable Development, IISD Model International Agreement on Investment for 
Sustainable Development (IISD, 2005). 
48
 Examples are individual complaints in international systems for the protection of human rights or investors’ 
rights under the Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of Other 
States or under other conventions. For an analysis of recent developments in access of private parties to 
international dispute settlement mechanisms, see M MacLaren, Rechte, Rechtsmittel und Rechtfertigungen im 
Völkerrecht. Eine Studie über den Zugang Privater zu internationalen Streitbeilegungsmechanismen (Zürich: 
Schulthess, 2008). 
49
 K Weilert, ‘Transnationale Unternehmen im rechtsfreien Raum?’ (2009) 69 ZaöRV 883, 907. An exception is 
the responsibility of individuals in international criminal law, cf B Simma and A Paulus, ‘The Responsibility of 
Individuals for Human Rights Abuses in Internal Conflicts: A Positivist View’ (1999) 93 American J Intl L 302. 
There is, however, no general corporate criminal liability as may be illustrated by the fact that the Rome Statute 
of the International Criminal Court has renounced on an article regarding legal persons. For international 
humanitarian law see International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), Business and International 
Humanitarian Law. An Introduction to the Rights and Obligations of Business Enterprises under International 
Humanitarian Law (ICRC, 2005). 
14 
Recently, the traditional view has been called in question. There is a debate if non-State actors 
like corporations may be classified as subjects of international law, and if so, to what extent. 
In this respect, the core texts for the international protection of human rights may be invoked 
which refer to non-State actors.
50
 There are scholars who deduce from the influence 
transnational corporations may have a presumption of legal personality
51
 or infer from 
existing treaties a partial legal personality.
52
 
For our context, this discussion shows that there are no objections in principle against the 
adoption of a binding international text imposing obligations on businesses in the different 
fields of CSR. It is not legal personality that determines rights and obligations, but, on the 
contrary, legal personality follows from the attribution of rights and duties. Therefore, the 
discussion on the international legal personality of corporations is of secondary importance. 
However, before dwelling on the topic of binding international instruments, we have to ask 
the more fundamental question if CSR needs legal rules at all. 
 
VI. CSR between Self-Interest and Altruism 
The subject of CSR touches upon a fundamental question of market economy which is the 
relationship between self-interest and altruism. Adam Smith had not contented himself with 
underlining the fundamental importance of self-interest but he had even warned against 
altruistic behaviour in an economic context: ‘By pursuing his own interest, he [every 
individual] frequently promotes that of the society more effectually than when he really 
intends to promote it. I have never known much good done by those who affected to trade for 
the public good.’53 Following this starting point, Milton Friedman has launched the most 
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radical attack against the social responsibility doctrine by saying that ‘there is one and only 
one social responsibility of business—to use its resources and engage in activities designed to 
increase its profits so long as it stays within the rules of the game, which is to say, engages in 
open and free competition without deception or fraud’.54 In this view, investing in CSR is 
spending someone else’s money (in the first place that of the shareholders, but employees and 
customers may be affected, too) in order to pursue goals which go beyond what is imposed by 
law. 
It is not surprising that the rejoinder to this criticism is based (in part) on the effect of CSR on 
(long-term) profit. It may be the case that the impact of CSR on the performance is positive. 
According to a recent adage, ‘sound ethics is good business in the long run’. There are more 
and more studies showing that companies which adhere to environmental and social goals 
going beyond legal requirements will have a better performance in the long run since, for 
example, sustainability research may reveal risks hitherto disregarded by traditional financial 
analysis. Moreover, a clear commitment to social responsibility may be the best way to attract 
and to retain high potentials. The value of the company’s brands may be increased. The only 
problem that critics like Milton Friedman would have in this situation is that the label of 
‘social responsibility’ for profit-seeking behaviour comes close to ‘hypocritical window-
dressing’.55 In the same sense, critics from the other side of the spectrum declare as worthless 
a concept which uses philanthropic labels for initiatives a company would have taken anyway 
and which simply allow it to ‘greenwash’ (environment) or to ‘bluewash’ (human rights) 
profit-maximizing strategies. In this view, CSR expressing the enlightened self-interest of a 
company is useless whereas ethical standards which are contrary to self-interest need binding 
rules and hence should be transformed into legal norms instead of voluntary standards. 
The fundamental question therefore is if and to what extent a private corporation should 
promote environmental and social goals if this investment does not lead to benefits at least in 
the long run. In the absence of positive effects, does CSR just cause supplementary costs 
reducing profits and going against the interests of the firm and market economy in general? 
The answer should be twofold. In countries with high legal standards in these areas and with a 
well-functioning rule of law, profit-seeking entities should not be expected to act against their 
self-interest. Here, the State apparently assumes its task of setting and implementing the rules 
which satisfactorily promote the public good so that it is sufficient for the companies to 
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comply.
56
 However, in countries where the legal standards are low and/or where the rules are 
not enforced, companies should on their own initiative respect the rules even though they are 
not enforced, or practise higher standards where the existing rules are not compatible with the 
values developed on the international level. 
This shows the importance of the Global Compact and of the other initiatives in the field of 
CSR: an international standard is developed which helps private actors to adopt rules filling in 
the gaps of the international economy. At the same time, these rules put competitors on an 
equal footing. It is not acceptable that companies which do not respect the international 
standards get a comparative advantage because they can produce at lower costs.
57
 In sum, the 
arguments lead back to the subject of self-interest. With the growing public awareness of the 
social and environmental impact of corporate behaviour it has become important for 
companies to incur and to honour commitments in this field.
58
 The relevance will increase 
rather than wane. The most important question in this context is if it will be sufficient to have 
a system based on the principle of voluntariness and on the absence of close monitoring or, on 
the contrary, if we need a legally binding scheme in which States or international 
organizations set the rules and where companies have to comply. 
 
VII. The Case for an International Code on Corporate Responsibility 
In our view, at this stage, middle ground has to be found. In a first step, the Global Compact 
should be strengthened. At present, it is non-obligatory in a double sense: a company cannot 
be forced to join the Global Compact (or other CSR initiatives),
59
 nor are companies—once 
participating—subject to a strict monitoring procedure. Regarding control, the Global 
Compact does not interpret its role as that of a regulatory authority. As we have seen, the 
Global Compact works on the basis of self-reporting: Participants have to report annually. 
However, the Global Compact does not verify the accuracy of COPs, but relies on the 
assessment of stakeholders. It confines itself to a platform that develops a framework for 
responsible business practices. The question may be asked if this approach is not too cautious. 
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Of course, the Global Compact is voluntary. But once companies have agreed to apply the 
principles and to report on progress, it would be desirable to have some sort of verification. In 
conformity with the principle of voluntariness, an additional element should be integrated into 
the Global Compact system: companies that wish to go a step further should have the 
possibility to accept external auditing in order to control not only the accuracy of their COPs 
but also the actual contribution of their actions to the implementation of the ten principles. 
Already, there is the possibility for certain businesses to do more: outstanding COPs qualify 
for the ‘Notable COP programme’ and are highlighted especially. External auditing should be 
added as a further condition for this distinction. Thus, it would be clear that a competent third 
party examined the information submitted. The standard of auditing could be the consistency 
requirement of the Danish legislation:
60
 the auditor would have to examine if the information 
submitted is free of contradictions and consistent with financial reporting of that company. 
In a second step, an International Code on Corporate Responsibility should be adopted. It 
would cover the most important fields of CSR mentioned above and could—in accordance 
with the heritage of the UN Codes of Conduct of the 1970s and 1980s—be adopted as a 
resolution of the UN General Assembly. The Code would refine the ten principles of the 
Global Compact (which seem too unspecific) by building on the OECD Guidelines, the UN 
Human Rights Norms for Corporations and the work of the Special Representative, and thus 
give clearer guidance on the substantive standards. The Code would be implemented under 
the Global Compact mechanism, ie the principle of voluntariness would be upheld. 
This is not satisfactory in the long run, though. It is certainly true that the scope of the CSR 
minimum standards has to be determined carefully in order to avoid stifling of international 
competition. However, once these standards have been defined, they should be respected by 
all firms. Otherwise, companies violating these minimum standards would have unfair 
competitive advantages. As we have seen, market-oriented instruments in the field of CSR do 
not work well in all respects. Hence, in a last stage, soft law should turn into hard law by 
concluding a multilateral treaty. It would oblige the contracting parties to adopt domestic 
rules applicable to firms subject to their laws or based in their country
61
 including an effective 
implementation mechanism. Implementation should be subject to a principle of subsidiarity: 
In the first place, the State in whose territory human rights violations occur is competent to 
handle complaints. If this State is not a party to the treaty or if it does not fulfil the treaty 
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obligations, victims should have the right to seek redress in the home State of the company in 
question. There is no sufficient reason to restrict these rules to transnational corporations; any 
business behaviour with an international dimension should be covered. In order to avoid over-
regulation and a ‘one size fits all’ approach, reporting duties should be based on the principle 
‘comply or explain’ known from the corporate governance world. Small and medium 
enterprises would have the possibility to renounce on social reporting if they explain why. 
Of course, the Code would not exclude the adoption of stricter international rules in selected 
areas (such as labour, environment, human rights, anti-corruption, antitrust). But it would 
constitute the cornerstone of a global system of corporate responsibility. 
 
VIII. Conclusion 
Recent developments in international economic law bring business and ethics closer together. 
Public awareness of the impact business behaviour may have on the environment and on 
human rights has risen. Hence, the market mechanism will often work in favour of the 
protection of public goods since business enterprises have a self-interest in sustainable 
business strategies and will respond to new consumer preferences. Certain marketing 
strategies, like Fairtrade or Eco-Labelling strengthen this effect. On the other hand, ethical 
consumerism has its limits. It works predominantly for trademarked or luxury goods and 
niche markets, but less well for cheap products, raw materials, and intermediate products. So, 
it is relatively easy to take measures against blood diamonds (Kimberley Process) or sports 
goods produced by child labour. However, ethical purchasing decisions are much less relevant 
for inhuman labour conditions in a coal mine. Moreover, in a realistic view, customers often 
say that they are willing to pay a price premium for good social and environmental behaviour 
of a manufacturer or distributor. But eventually, they do not always act as announced. 
This mixed balance shows that it is indispensable to provide for binding minimum standards 
in the field of CSR filling the regulatory gaps of the globalized world. The proposal made 
here is the adoption of an International Code on Corporate Responsibility. The Code would 
have many advantages. Business ethics would be transformed into a regulatory framework 
thus creating a level playing field without hampering international competition. Acceptance of 
market economy principles by the population would be strengthened. It cannot be underlined 
too often, and not only in times characterized by financial and economic crisis, that the trust 
of the population in private companies is a cornerstone of a market economy. And finally, the 
Code would cure a grave deficit of international economic law: At present, there are many 
19 
binding rules facilitating market access in favour of private actors.
62
 But there are only few 
obligations imposed on businesses.
63
 For example, the TRIPs agreement provides for high 
standards of intellectual property protection. But there is no international treaty on antitrust 
law imposing limits to business strategies.
64
 One of the most important desiderata of 
international economic law is the establishment of a balance between rights and duties of 
business enterprises. Much public criticism, for example coming from the anti- or alter-
globalization movement since the late 1990s, seems to originate from the one-sidedness of the 
legal framework. An International Code on Corporate Responsibility could contribute to 
establishing a world economic order worthy of the name. 
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